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We often think of reality as coming in "layers": the fundamental particles at the "bottom", atoms and molecules at the next level up, then cells, multicellular organisms, natural objects like rocks and artificial objects like tables, all the way up to complex systems of objects like ecosystems or societies. But what is the relationship between those layers? Reductionists suggest, metaphorically speaking, that there really is only one layer: it's really all just, say, fundamental particles and fields in space and time. Such views can be hard to defend; for one, it can be hard to translate our talk of tables or humans into descriptions purely in terms of fundamental particles. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that what happens in a cell, or how a cell interacts with its environment, isn't completely determined by goings on at the molecular level which in turn can be traced "down", eventually, to what is happening, at the level of fundamental particles. Such claims about how some lower levels explain what happens at higher levels are often described as grounding claims. What precisely is grounding though? What is its relation to forms of reduction? And to efficient causation? Prerequisites: PHIL 60, PHIL 80, PHIL 150, and one course in contemporary theoretical philosophy ( PHIL 180 to PHIL 189); or equivalent courses. Instructor Permission Required.