121 - 130 of 147 results for: ECON

Basic theories and recent developments in mechanism design and the theory of contracts. Topics include: hidden characteristics and hidden action models with one and many agents, design of mechanisms and markets with limited communication, long-term relationships under commitment and under renegotiation, property rights and theories of the firm.

This class will focus on several topics in auction market design and related areas. It is an advanced course, intended as a sequel to the more basic market/mechanism/auction design courses offered at the Economics department and the GSB. Students are expected to be familiar with the material in those courses. We will briefly review some basics of auction theory, but the main goal of the class is to bring students closer to doing independent research and introduce them to recent contributions and currently active research areas. Specific topics may include: multi-item and combinatorial auctions; robust auction design; applied auction design with practical applications; matching and pricing on the Internet; radio spectrum auctions; securities markets; commodities; complex procurements. Grading based on presentation, assignment, and term paper.

Technology has enabled the emergence of economic systems of formerly inconceivable complexity. Nevertheless, some technology-related economic problems are so complex that either supercomputers cannot solve them in a reasonable time, or they are too complex for humans to comprehend. Thus, modern economic designs must still be simple enough for humans to understand, and must address computationally complex problems in an efficient fashion. This topics course explores simplicity and complexity in economics, primarily via theoretical models. We will focus on recent advances. Key topics include (but are not limited to) resource allocation in complex environments, communication complexity and information aggregation in markets, robust mechanisms, dynamic matching theory, influence maximization in networks, and the design of simple (user-friendly) mechanisms. Some applications include paired kidney exchange, auctions for electricity and for radio spectrum, ride-sharing platforms, and the diffusion of information. Prerequisites: Econ 203 or equivalent.

This is an introduction to market design, intended mainly for second year PhD students in economics (but also open to other graduates students from around the university and to undergrads who have taken undergrad market design). It will emphasize the combined use of economic theory, experiments and empirical analysis to analyze and engineer market rules and institutions. In this first quarter we will pay particular attention to matching markets, which are those in which price doesn't do all of the work, and which include some kind of application or selection process. In recent years market designers have participated in the design and implementation of a number of marketplaces, and the course will emphasize the relation between theory and practice, for example in the design of labor market clearinghouses for American doctors, and school choice programs in a growing number of American cities (including New York and Boston), and the allocation of organs for transplantation. Various forms of market failure will also be discussed.nAssignment: One final paper. The objective of the final paper is to study an existing market or an environment with a potential role for a market, describe the relevant market design questions, and evaluate how the current market design works and/or propose improvements on the current design.

Aims to provide a solid basis in game-theoretic tools and concepts, both for theorists and for students focusing in other fields. Technical material will include solution concepts and refinements, potential games, supermodular games, repeated games, reputation, and bargaining models. The class will also address some foundational issues, such as epistemic and evolutionary modeling.Prerequisite: 203 or consent of instructor.

This course studies computational approaches for solving dynamic economic models. First, it provides background in numerical analysis (approximation, integration, optimization, error analysis), and describes local and global numerical methods (perturbation, Smolyak, endogenous grid, stochastic simulation, cluster grid methods). Then, it shows applications from recent economic literature representing challenges to computational methods (new Keynesian models with a zero lower bound, default risk models, Krusell-Smith models, international trade models, overlapping-generations models, nonstationary growth models, dynamic games). Finally, it surveys recent developments in software and hardware (Python, Julia, GPUs, parallel computing, supercomputers), as well as machine learning techniques. No prerequisites. Grading on the basis of problem sets and a final project.

Topics course covering a variety of game theory topics with emphasis on market design, such as matching theory and auction theory. Final paper required. Prerequisites: ECON 285 or equivalent. ECON 283 recommended.

Students and faculty review and present recent research papers on basic theories and economic applications of decision theory, game theory and mechanism design. Applications include market design and analyses of incentives and strategic behavior in markets, and selected topics such as auctions, bargaining, contracting, and computation.

Synthesis of research on social and economic networks by sociologists, economists, computer scientists, physicists, and mathematicians, with an emphasis on modeling. Includes methods for describing and measuring networks, empirical observations about network structure, models of random and strategic network formation, as well as analyses of contagion, diffusion, learning, peer influence, games played on networks, and networked markets.