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241 - 250 of 317 results for: PHIL

PHIL 284B: Formal Epistemology (PHIL 184B)

Grads enroll in 284B. Prerequisite: PHIL 80.
Last offered: Spring 2021 | Units: 4

PHIL 284P: Philosophy of Probability (PHIL 184P)

Graduate students enroll in 284P.
Terms: Spr | Units: 4
Instructors: Warren, J. (PI)

PHIL 286: Philosophy of Mind (PHIL 186)

(Graduate students register for 286.) This is an advanced introduction to core topics in the philosophy of mind. Prerequisite: PHIL 80
Terms: Win | Units: 4

PHIL 287: Philosophy of Action (PHIL 187)

This course will explore foundational issues about individual agency, explanation of action, reasons and causes, agency in the natural world, practical rationality, interpretation, teleological explanation, intention and intentional action, agency and time, intention and belief, knowledge of one's own actions, identification and hierarchy, and shared agency. Prerequisite: Phil 80 and two more Phil course numbered above 100 (all courses taken prior to this term), or PhD student in Philosophy. Must be an MA or PhD student in Philosophy to attend 287. 
Terms: Aut | Units: 4
Instructors: Bratman, M. (PI)

PHIL 287B: Responsibility and the Criminal Law (PHIL 187B)

In this course, we will bring resources from philosophy of action to bear on questions about who should (or should not) be held criminally liable, and why. The class will be organized in three parts. In the first part of the class, students will gain a basic understanding of the relationship between moral and legal responsibility and of the way in which modern Anglo-American criminal legal doctrine is organized. In the second part of the class, we will concern ourselves with how best to characterize the relation between an individual's mens rea, or "guilty mind," and their performance of an actus reus, or "guilty act," necessary for the justifiable imposition of liability for commission of a crime. In the third part of the class, we will take a social turn. We will consider how relationships between individuals - as aiders to commission of crimes, as members of conspiracies, as members of corporations, and as citizens of states - might support more complicated forms of responsibility a more »
In this course, we will bring resources from philosophy of action to bear on questions about who should (or should not) be held criminally liable, and why. The class will be organized in three parts. In the first part of the class, students will gain a basic understanding of the relationship between moral and legal responsibility and of the way in which modern Anglo-American criminal legal doctrine is organized. In the second part of the class, we will concern ourselves with how best to characterize the relation between an individual's mens rea, or "guilty mind," and their performance of an actus reus, or "guilty act," necessary for the justifiable imposition of liability for commission of a crime. In the third part of the class, we will take a social turn. We will consider how relationships between individuals - as aiders to commission of crimes, as members of conspiracies, as members of corporations, and as citizens of states - might support more complicated forms of responsibility and liability. Prerequisites: graduate student standing in philosophy or, for others, prior course work in philosophy that includes Philosophy 80 plus one other course in Philosophy numbered over 99. Undergraduates should enroll in Phil 187B. Only MA students in Philosophy and PhD students in Philosophy or related PhD programs should enroll in Phil 287B.
Terms: Win | Units: 4

PHIL 288A: Explanation (PHIL 188A)

We talk about explanations all the time whether in everyday conversations or in physics, chemistry, medicine, engineering, or economics. But what is an explanation? What is needed in order to have an explanation of something? Are there fundamentally different kinds of explanation? Are there distinctive forms of explanation in mathematics or metaphysics? Does all explanation have to do with causation? Do all explanations need to be backed by laws? Do explanatory relations determine the fundamental structure of reality? Instructor Permission Required.
Terms: Win | Units: 4
Instructors: Hussain, N. (PI)

PHIL 289: Reduction and Grounding (PHIL 189)

We often think of reality as coming in "layers": the fundamental particles at the "bottom", atoms and molecules at the next level up, then cells, multicellular organisms, natural objects like rocks and artificial objects like tables, all the way up to complex systems of objects like ecosystems or societies. But what is the relationship between those layers? Reductionists suggest, metaphorically speaking, that there really is only one layer: it's really all just, say, fundamental particles and fields in space and time. Such views can be hard to defend; for one, it can be hard to translate our talk of tables or humans into descriptions purely in terms of fundamental particles. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that what happens in a cell, or how a cell interacts with its environment, isn't completely determined by goings on at the molecular level which in turn can be traced "down", eventually, to what is happening, at the level of fundamental particles. Such claims about how some more »
We often think of reality as coming in "layers": the fundamental particles at the "bottom", atoms and molecules at the next level up, then cells, multicellular organisms, natural objects like rocks and artificial objects like tables, all the way up to complex systems of objects like ecosystems or societies. But what is the relationship between those layers? Reductionists suggest, metaphorically speaking, that there really is only one layer: it's really all just, say, fundamental particles and fields in space and time. Such views can be hard to defend; for one, it can be hard to translate our talk of tables or humans into descriptions purely in terms of fundamental particles. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that what happens in a cell, or how a cell interacts with its environment, isn't completely determined by goings on at the molecular level which in turn can be traced "down", eventually, to what is happening, at the level of fundamental particles. Such claims about how some lower levels explain what happens at higher levels are often described as grounding claims. What precisely is grounding though? What is its relation to forms of reduction? And to efficient causation? Prerequisites: PHIL 60, PHIL 80, PHIL 150, and one course in contemporary theoretical philosophy ( PHIL 180 to PHIL 189); or equivalent courses. Instructor Permission Required.
Last offered: Winter 2025 | Units: 4

PHIL 297C: Curricular Practical Training

Students engage in internship work and integrate that work into their academic program. Following internship work, students complete a research report outlining work activity. Meets the requirements for curricular practical training for students on F-1 visas. Student is responsible for arranging own internship/employment and faculty sponsorship. Register under faculty sponsor's section number. Course may be repeated for credit.
Last offered: Summer 2024 | Units: 1 | Repeatable 4 times (up to 1 units total)

PHIL 298: Research Methods

Research Methods will introduce incoming students to Stanford's many libraries and library resources. Throughout the quarter, students will have regular research tasks on campus, structured with the aim of familiarizing students with our libraries, librarians and resource specialists. For first year Philosophy PhDs only, department permission required.
Last offered: Autumn 2022 | Units: 1

PHIL 300: Proseminar

Topically focused seminar. Required of all first year Philosophy PhD students. This seminar is limited to first-year Ph.D. students in Philosophy.
Terms: Aut | Units: 4
Instructors: Teitel, T. (PI)
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