321 - 330 of 459 results for: PHIL

What is sex? What are the implications of different conceptions of sex for sexual ethics? Are there any distinctively sexual ethical principles or virtues or are principles and virtues that govern the sexual domain specific instances of principles and virtues that govern human activity more generally? Readings will range from historical to contemporary sources.

Focus is on the ideal of a just society, and the place of liberty and equality in it, in light of contemporary theories of justice and political controversies. Topics include financing schools and elections, regulating markets, discriminating against people with disabilities, and enforcing sexual morality. Counts as Writing in the Major for PoliSci majors.

This course traces the development of moral philosophy in Britain just prior to the nearly simultaneous emergence of Kant's moral philosophy and Bentham's utilitarianism in the 1780's. Emphasis is on the dialogue between empiricists and rationalists on the subject of the relationship between the natural and the normative. Authors include Hobbes, Clarke, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Price, and Bentham. Prerequisite: some familiarity with Kant's moral theory and utilitarianism, and demonstrated interest in philosophy.

Some moral obligations are "relational," "directional," or "bipolar" in structure: in promising you to act in a certain way, for example, I incur an obligation to you to so act and you acquire a corresponding claim or right against me that I so act. This entails that if I violate my obligation to you, I will not merely be doing something that is morally wrong, but will be wronging you in particular. What does explain this? Do all moral obligations have this structure? We will discuss how different moral theories (consequentialist, deontological, contractualist) try to account for such obligations. Readings include Adams, Anscombe, Darwall, Feinberg, Hart, Parfit, Raz, Scanlon, Skorupski, Thompson, Thomson, Wallace, and Wolf.

An exploration of some central themes from the work of Bernard Williams. Particular attention will be paid to his discussion of the character and identity of the self, his sustained critique of morality and moral philosophy. We will also read several of Williams¿ interlocutors, including Nagel, Parfit, Korsgaard, and Herman.

We sometimes think we should do something just because it will benefit us in the future, even though we don¿t particularly feel like doing it now (e.g. we exercise, go to the dentist for a check-up, or set aside money for retirement). And we sometimes think we should do something for the sake of another person, even when it is inconvenient, costly, or unpleasant (e.g. we stop to help a stranded motorist, donate to charity, or tell someone an embarrassing truth rather than a face-saving lie). When we do the former, we act prudently. When we do the latter, we act morally. This course explores the debate among philosophers about the source of our reasons for acting prudently and morally. Some argue that our reasons to be prudent and moral stem directly from the fact that we are rational ¿ that it is contrary to reason to ignore our own future interests, or the interests of other people. Others disagree, arguing that the source of these reasons must lie elsewhere. Course readings will include work by Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, Christine Korsgaard, Derek Parfit, Philippa Foot, and others.

This a graduate student only introduction to contemporary metaethics. Can moral and ethical values be justified or is it just a matter of opinion? Is there a difference between facts and values? Are there any moral truths? Does it matter if there are not? Focus is not on which things or actions are valuable or morally right, but what is value or rightness itself. Prerequisites: 280, 281, and an ethics course.

This course will investigate a cluster of varied but related philosophical issues concerning the arts¿music, painting, literature, poetry, photography, theater, film, etc.¿issues most of which are, at the same time, problems in philosophy of mind or language, value theory, or epistemology. We will address questions like the following (though probably not all of them): What, if anything, is distinctive about art and aesthetic experience?, What is aesthetic value, and how do aesthetic values relate to and interact with moral values and values of other kinds?, What is fiction and why are people interested in it?, In what ways are works of art expressive of feelings or emotions? What similarities and differences are there in the expressive qualities of music, literature, painting, poetry? How might we learn from works of art of one or another kind, and how might they work to change people's perspectives or attitudes?, In what ways do artworks serve as vehicles of communication? Are the values of works of art fundamentally different from those of beautiful natural objects? Along the way, we will bump into more specific questions such as: Why and in what ways is photography more (or less) 'realistic' than painting and drawing, or more or less revealing of reality? Does (instrumental) music have cognitive or semantic content? Is music representational in anything like the ways literature and figurative painting are?, Do all literary works have narrators? Is there ever (or always?) anything like narrators in paintings, films, music? Prerequisite: One course in philosophy, or permission of the instructor.

(Graduate students register for 274.) Confronted with the question of how to act, people think of themselves as freely determining their own conduct. Natural science poses a challenge to this by explaining all events, including human actions, in terms of causal processes. Are people justified in thinking of themselves as free? Major philosophical approaches to this question: incompatibilism, compatibilism, and the two-standpoint view.