PHIL 386: Topics in Philosophy of Mind
This is a graduate seminar in philosophy of mind, focusing on the nature of psychological explanation. 2 unit option for PhD students only. May be repeated for credit.
Terms: Win
| Units: 2-4
| Repeatable
3 times
(up to 12 units total)
Instructors:
Malmgren, A. (PI)
PHIL 386B: Husserl and Adam Smith
Readings from Husserl and others in the phenomenological tradition, and recent work on intentionality and consciousness by philosophers and cognitive scientists.
Last offered: Autumn 2008
PHIL 386C: Subjectivity
Continuation of 386B.
Last offered: Autumn 2006
PHIL 386D: Personal Identity
Focus on personal identity as a case study in metaphysical indeterminacy. The classic puzzles of PI can be construed as arguments that it can be indeterminate whether person A is identical to person B, and indeed, whether person A exists. Can such cases of indeterminacy be plausibly interpreted as semantic (or epistemic), or do they support the possibility of worldly or "ontic" indeterminacy? Is ontic indeterminacy even coherent? How might it be modeled? Parallel questions arise in the metaphysics of ordinary material objects, of course; but it's not obvious that their answers should also run parallel. And even if they do, focusing on PI lends the questions some real urgency. How should I feel about the interests of a past or future person who's only indeterminately me? Should I fear a future in which I merely indeterminately exist? Maybe outright death is preferable to being literally liminal. Seminar. Graduate work in core philosophy a prerequisite.
Last offered: Winter 2013
PHIL 386E: About Being
A pop-up course on Burgess' eponymous book project, which deals with the metaphysics of linguistic representation in the service of developing a methodology for adjudicating ontological disputes. Keywords: linguistic turn, Plato's beard, problem of intentionality, grounding, deflationism, metaontology, etc. Readings will be a mix of chapter drafts and recent, relevant work by other people, including Rayo, Sider, Manley & Hawthorne; with a couple classics by Quine and Stalnaker thrown in for good measure.
Last offered: Spring 2014
PHIL 387: Intention and Normative Judgment
Prominent views in both metaethics and the philosophy of action hold that there are distinctively practical states of mind that nonetheless play many of the roles traditionally associated with belief. Some action theorists hold that intention is a kind of practical attitude subject to rational requirements such as requirements of consistency and coherence. Metaethical noncognitivists hold that normative judgments are distinctively practical¿perhaps even a species of intention¿and face the well-known Frege-Geach problem because of that commitment. We will consider what metaethicists can learn from debates about intention in the philosophy of action, and what philosophers of action can learn from debates about metaethical non-cognitivism.
Last offered: Winter 2014
PHIL 387B: Plan Rationality
This seminar will explore foundational issues about practical rationality as they arise in the context of agency in which planning plays a basic role. We will consider issues both about rationality at a time and about rationality over time.nOpen to graduate students in Philosophy and to others by permission.
Last offered: Winter 2016
PHIL 387C: Consistency and Coherence
Some philosophers think that attitudes like belief and intention are subject to consistency and coherence requirements. Are there such general purpose cogency requirements on attitudes? If so, what is their nature and strength? What grounds these requirements; for instance, does the point or purpose of a belief or an intention ground consistency and coherence requirements on that attitude? How are such requirements on belief related to requirements on intention? How does the answer to such questions bear on understanding of the interrelations between theoretical and practical rationality?
Last offered: Spring 2010
PHIL 387D: Rationality over Time
Last offered: Winter 2013
PHIL 387F: Grad Seminar
An introduction to truthmaker semantics, recently developed by Fine and others, and considering some of the applications to natural and formal languages.nThere will be a focus both on presenting the semantics in rigorous fashion and showing, in detail, how it might be applied in a number of different areas. Grad seminar with Kit Fine. 2 unit option for PhD students only.
Terms: Spr
| Units: 2-4
Instructors:
Fine, K. (PI)
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