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421 - 426 of 426 results for: PHIL

PHIL 386E: About Being

A pop-up course on Burgess' eponymous book project, which deals with the metaphysics of linguistic representation in the service of developing a methodology for adjudicating ontological disputes. Keywords: linguistic turn, Plato's beard, problem of intentionality, grounding, deflationism, metaontology, etc. Readings will be a mix of chapter drafts and recent, relevant work by other people, including Rayo, Sider, Manley & Hawthorne; with a couple classics by Quine and Stalnaker thrown in for good measure.

PHIL 387: Intention and Normative Judgment

Prominent views in both metaethics and the philosophy of action hold that there are distinctively practical states of mind that nonetheless play many of the roles traditionally associated with belief. Some action theorists hold that intention is a kind of practical attitude subject to rational requirements such as requirements of consistency and coherence. Metaethical noncognitivists hold that normative judgments are distinctively practical¿perhaps even a species of intention¿and face the well-known Frege-Geach problem because of that commitment. We will consider what metaethicists can learn from debates about intention in the philosophy of action, and what philosophers of action can learn from debates about metaethical non-cognitivism.

PHIL 387C: Consistency and Coherence

Some philosophers think that attitudes like belief and intention are subject to consistency and coherence requirements. Are there such general purpose cogency requirements on attitudes? If so, what is their nature and strength? What grounds these requirements; for instance, does the point or purpose of a belief or an intention ground consistency and coherence requirements on that attitude? How are such requirements on belief related to requirements on intention? How does the answer to such questions bear on understanding of the interrelations between theoretical and practical rationality?

PHIL 387D: Rationality over Time

PHIL 387S: Practical Reasons and Practical Reasoning

Attempts to develop alternatives to Humean, instrumentalist conceptions of practical reasoning, and alternatives to Humean, non-cognitivist views of practical reasons. Readings include Aurel Kolnai, Bernard Williams, David Wiggins, Joseph Raz, Michael Bratman, Elijah Millgram, and T.M. Scanlon.

PHIL 470: Proseminar in Moral Psychology

Restricted to Philosophy doctoral students. May be repeated for credit.
| Repeatable for credit
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