171 - 180 of 459 results for: PHIL

Some moral obligations are "relational," "directional," or "bipolar" in structure: in promising you to act in a certain way, for example, I incur an obligation to you to so act and you acquire a corresponding claim or right against me that I so act. This entails that if I violate my obligation to you, I will not merely be doing something that is morally wrong, but will be wronging you in particular. What does explain this? Do all moral obligations have this structure? We will discuss how different moral theories (consequentialist, deontological, contractualist) try to account for such obligations. Readings include Adams, Anscombe, Darwall, Feinberg, Hart, Parfit, Raz, Scanlon, Skorupski, Thompson, Thomson, Wallace, and Wolf.

An exploration of some central themes from the work of Bernard Williams. Particular attention will be paid to his discussion of the character and identity of the self, his sustained critique of morality and moral philosophy. We will also read several of Williams¿ interlocutors, including Nagel, Parfit, Korsgaard, and Herman.

We sometimes think we should do something just because it will benefit us in the future, even though we don¿t particularly feel like doing it now (e.g. we exercise, go to the dentist for a check-up, or set aside money for retirement). And we sometimes think we should do something for the sake of another person, even when it is inconvenient, costly, or unpleasant (e.g. we stop to help a stranded motorist, donate to charity, or tell someone an embarrassing truth rather than a face-saving lie). When we do the former, we act prudently. When we do the latter, we act morally. This course explores the debate among philosophers about the source of our reasons for acting prudently and morally. Some argue that our reasons to be prudent and moral stem directly from the fact that we are rational ¿ that it is contrary to reason to ignore our own future interests, or the interests of other people. Others disagree, arguing that the source of these reasons must lie elsewhere. Course readings will include work by Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, Christine Korsgaard, Derek Parfit, Philippa Foot, and others.

What if a metaphor is an instructively compact work of art, or if finding a metaphor apt is an instructively simple case of finding something aesthetically valuable? What does this reveal about the nature of art and language? Introduction to the philosophical study of art and aesthetic value, organized around metaphor. Contemporary accounts of metaphor as a verbal device. Arguments for the existence of nonverbal metaphor in nonliterary arts. The power and appeal of metaphors drawn from art, art criticism, theoretical inquiry, and everyday life.

This is an undergraduate only class. Can moral and ethical values be justified or is it just a matter of opinion? Is there a difference between facts and values? Are there any moral truths? Does it matter if there are not? Is anything in life really valuable or meaningful? Focus is not on which things or actions are valuable or morally right, but what is value or rightness itself. Contemporary metaethics. Prerequisites: 1 and 80.

This course will investigate a cluster of varied but related philosophical issues concerning the arts¿music, painting, literature, poetry, photography, theater, film, etc.¿issues most of which are, at the same time, problems in philosophy of mind or language, value theory, or epistemology. We will address questions like the following (though probably not all of them): What, if anything, is distinctive about art and aesthetic experience?, What is aesthetic value, and how do aesthetic values relate to and interact with moral values and values of other kinds?, What is fiction and why are people interested in it?, In what ways are works of art expressive of feelings or emotions? What similarities and differences are there in the expressive qualities of music, literature, painting, poetry? How might we learn from works of art of one or another kind, and how might they work to change people's perspectives or attitudes?, In what ways do artworks serve as vehicles of communication? Are the values of works of art fundamentally different from those of beautiful natural objects? Along the way, we will bump into more specific questions such as: Why and in what ways is photography more (or less) 'realistic' than painting and drawing, or more or less revealing of reality? Does (instrumental) music have cognitive or semantic content? Is music representational in anything like the ways literature and figurative painting are?, Do all literary works have narrators? Is there ever (or always?) anything like narrators in paintings, films, music? Prerequisite: One course in philosophy, or permission of the instructor.

(Graduate students register for 274.) Confronted with the question of how to act, people think of themselves as freely determining their own conduct. Natural science poses a challenge to this by explaining all events, including human actions, in terms of causal processes. Are people justified in thinking of themselves as free? Major philosophical approaches to this question: incompatibilism, compatibilism, and the two-standpoint view.

Morally controversial uses of markets and market reasoning in areas such as organ sales, procreation, education, and child labor. Would a market for organ donation make saving lives more efficient; if it did, would it thereby be justified? Should a nation be permitted to buy the right to pollute? Readings include Walzer, Arrow, Rawls, Sen, Frey, Titmuss, and empirical cases.

We draw a fundamental distinction between what a person voluntarily does, and what is beyond her control. Such a distinction seems central to how we think about what it is to justify our actions (whether to ourselves or to one another), as well as to our practice of holding one another morally responsible for what we do. Yet under pressure, this distinction can appear to collapse ¿ we find that we cannot successfully disentangle what a person controls from what she does not when she acts. This course examines this problem in depth, and considers how we might respond in the face of it: Is it really a problem? If so, does it threaten our moral practices? How should it influence the way in which we make choices, or the way we understand those choices once we¿ve made them?