351 - 360 of 499 results for: PHIL

A critical exploration of some of the main forms of systematic moral theorizing in Western philosophy from Hobbes onward and their roots in ancient ethical thought. Prerequistes are some prior familiarity with utilitarianism and Kantian ethics and a demonstrated interest in philosophy.

Some moral obligations are "relational," "directional," or "bipolar" in structure: in promising you to act in a certain way, for example, I incur an obligation to you to so act and you acquire a corresponding claim or right against me that I so act. This entails that if I violate my obligation to you, I will not merely be doing something that is morally wrong, but will be wronging you in particular. What does explain this? Do all moral obligations have this structure? We will discuss how different moral theories (consequentialist, deontological, contractualist) try to account for such obligations. Readings include Adams, Anscombe, Darwall, Feinberg, Hart, Parfit, Raz, Scanlon, Skorupski, Thompson, Thomson, Wallace, and Wolf.

An exploration of some central themes from the work of Bernard Williams. Particular attention will be paid to his discussion of the character and identity of the self, his sustained critique of morality and moral philosophy. We will also read several of Williams¿ interlocutors, including Nagel, Parfit, Korsgaard, and Herman.

We sometimes think we should do something just because it will benefit us in the future, even though we don¿t particularly feel like doing it now (e.g. we exercise, go to the dentist for a check-up, or set aside money for retirement). And we sometimes think we should do something for the sake of another person, even when it is inconvenient, costly, or unpleasant (e.g. we stop to help a stranded motorist, donate to charity, or tell someone an embarrassing truth rather than a face-saving lie). When we do the former, we act prudently. When we do the latter, we act morally. This course explores the debate among philosophers about the source of our reasons for acting prudently and morally. Some argue that our reasons to be prudent and moral stem directly from the fact that we are rational ¿ that it is contrary to reason to ignore our own future interests, or the interests of other people. Others disagree, arguing that the source of these reasons must lie elsewhere. Course readings will include work by Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, Christine Korsgaard, Derek Parfit, Philippa Foot, and others.

This a graduate student only introduction to contemporary metaethics. Can moral and ethical values be justified or is it just a matter of opinion? Is there a difference between facts and values? Are there any moral truths? Does it matter if there are not? Focus is not on which things or actions are valuable or morally right, but what is value or rightness itself. Prerequisites: 280, 281, and an ethics course.

The past three decades have seen the elaboration of a vast body of literature on unconditional basic income a radical policy proposal Philippe Van Parijs referred to as a disarmingly simple idea. It consists of a monthly cash allowance given to all citizens, regardless of personal desert and without means test to provide them with a standard of living above the poverty line. The seminar will seek to engage students in normative debates in political theory (feminism, liberalism, republicanism, communism, libertarianism, etc.) by appealing to the concrete example of basic income. It will allow students to learn a great deal about a policy that is gaining tremendous currency in academic and public debates, while discussing and learning about prominent political theorists - many of whom have written against or for basic income at one point in their career. nThe seminar is open to graduate students in all departments. There are no pre-requisites. Juniors and Seniors interested can email the PI to express interest. We will ask questions such as: is giving people cash no strings attached desirable and just? Would basic income promote a more gender equal society through the remuneration of care-work, or would it risks further entrenching the position of women as care-givers? Would alternative policies be more successful (such as the job guarantees, stakeholder grants or a negative income tax)? How can we test out basic income? What makes for a reliable and ethical basic income pilot? Students in Politics, Philosophy, Public Policy, Social Work, and Sociology should find most of those questions relevant to their interests. Some discussions on how to fund basic income, on the macro-economic implications of basic income and on the existing pilots projects (in Finland, Namibia, India Canada and the US) may be of interest to Economists; while our readings on the impact of new technologies and artificial intelligence on the future of work and whether a basic income could be a solution, are likely to be on interest to computer scientists and engineers. By the end of the class, students will have an in depth knowledge of the policy and will have developed skills in the normative analysis of public policy. They will be able to deploy those critical and analytical skills to assess a broad range of other policies. May be repeated for credit. 2 unit option for PhD students only. This course must be taken for a minimum of 3 units and a letter grade to be eligible for Ways credit.

This course will investigate a cluster of varied but related philosophical issues concerning the arts - music, painting, literature, poetry, photography, theater, film, etc.- issues most of which are, at the same time, problems in philosophy of mind or language, value theory, or epistemology. We will address questions like the following (though probably not all of them): What, if anything, is distinctive about art and aesthetic experience?, What is aesthetic value, and how do aesthetic values relate to and interact with moral values and values of other kinds?, What is fiction and why are people interested in it?, In what ways are works of art expressive of feelings or emotions? What similarities and differences are there in the expressive qualities of music, literature, painting, poetry? How might we learn from works of art of one or another kind, and how might they work to change people's perspectives or attitudes?, In what ways do artworks serve as vehicles of communication? Are the values of works of art fundamentally different from those of beautiful natural objects? Along the way, we will bump into more specific questions such as: Why and in what ways is photography more (or less) 'realistic' than painting and drawing, or more or less revealing of reality? Does (instrumental) music have cognitive or semantic content? Is music representational in anything like the ways literature and figurative painting are?, Do all literary works have narrators? Is there ever (or always?) anything like narrators in paintings, films, music? Prerequisite: One course in philosophy, or permission of the instructor.

(Graduate students register for 274.) Confronted with the question of how to act, people think of themselves as freely determining their own conduct. Natural science poses a challenge to this by explaining all events, including human actions, in terms of causal processes. Are people justified in thinking of themselves as free? Major philosophical approaches to this question: incompatibilism, compatibilism, and the two-standpoint view.

Morally controversial uses of markets and market reasoning in areas such as organ sales, procreation, education, and child labor. Would a market for organ donation make saving lives more efficient; if it did, would it thereby be justified? Should a nation be permitted to buy the right to pollute? Readings include Walzer, Arrow, Rawls, Sen, Frey, Titmuss, and empirical cases.